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Abstract
This paper is based on a panel we organized at the “First Annual Conference on
Emerging Research Frontiers in International Business Studies”, organized by the Journal of
International Business Studies (JIBS), to discuss several new lines of research in international
strategy. Four lines of research are developed: The strategic implications of semiglobalization,
the impact of institutional voids in international strategy, primitives and levels of analysis in
international business, and strategies for the base of the pyramid. Taken together, these studies
aim to open a new frontier in our understanding of International Strategy, based on the
co-location of firms and places as a key element in international business.
Keywords: international business; semiglobalization; international strategy; base of the
pyramid; institutions; competitivenessNEW FRONTIERS IN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY
1.- Introduction
This paper is based on a panel we organized at the “First Annual Conference on
Emerging Research Frontiers in International Business Studies”, organized by the Journal
of International Business Studies (JIBS),  to  discuss  several  new  lines  of  research  in
international strategy. This introductory section begins with a review of the International
Business (IB) literature, followed by an analysis of the key research streams in the literature.
The  body  of  the  paper  describes  the  main  insights  presented  by  the  panellists  in  the
discussion entitled “New Frontiers in International Strategy”. 
International business research has focused on a number of issues directly linked to
firm strategy. In the 1970s and 1980s, many of the issues of interest in the strategy field, such
as  industry  environments,  market  share-performance  linkages,  positioning  and  generic
strategies, market and customer selection, oligopolistic strategies, and diversification, had
their  counterparts  in  the  international  business  literature.  In  many  cases,  international
business researchers addressed much the same questions as strategy researchers, either with
the  added  complexity  of  studying  management  across  multiple  country  operations  or
performing comparative studies. In other cases, such as diversification, where international
business researchers focused on geographic diversification while strategy researchers focused
on industry diversification, international business researchers worked on analogous, if not
identical, issues. Transaction cost theories of the firm were developed more or less at the
same  time  as  transaction  cost  theories  of  the  multinational  firm.  The  same  is  true  of
knowledge-based views of the firm in the strategy field and knowledge-based views of the
multinational firm in the international business literature.
In recent years, however, the field of international business appears to have focused
more  on  the  management  and  organization  of  multinational  companies  and  less  on  the
underlying  strategies  of  the  firms  involved.  Even  though  several  recurrent  themes  in  IB
research, including the underlying rationale for the existence of multinational companies, the
process  of  internationalisation  and  foreign  market  entry,  and  the  organization  and
management  of  multinational  firms,  have  direct  links  to  firms’  international  strategy,
international business research seems increasingly to have focused on “how” multinationals
do what they do, rather than “what” they do, or “why” they do it in the first place. The IB
literature  has  accepted  the  strong  belief  that  the  logical  response  to  globalization  is  the
Multinational  Corporation.  International  strategy  was  to  be  global  strategy,  a  strategy
developed from MNC headquarters’ point of view. The world was globalizing, companies
needed  to  respond  to  globalization  by  arbitraging  on  local  advantages  and  exploiting
tremendous economies of scale. Defining strategy, and especially organization, for this new
beast, the MNC, was to be the key focus of the strategic agenda of international strategy.In addition to the links identified above, several of the focal issues in IB research
have  close  links  to  the  strategy  field,  including  the  rationale  for  the  multinational  firm,
internationalisation and market entry strategies, locational strategies, and the organization
and management of multinational firms.
IB Research Streams
There are several recurrent themes in the IB literature, including the rationales for
multinational  firms,  the  process  of  internationalization,  entry  modes  for  international
expansion,  location  decisions,  and  the  management  of  international  subsidiaries.  Several
rationales for the existence of the multinational firm have been suggested in the literature,
including  product  life  cycles  (Vernon,  1966),  oligopolistic  interaction  (Hymer,  1976),
transaction  costs  for  intangible  assets  (Caves,  1996;  Buckley  &  Casson,  1976;  Hennart,
1982), and the ability to obtain and deploy knowledge across international markets (Kogut
and Zander, 1993). The internationalization process also has received attention (Johanson &
Vahlne,  1977,  1990),  as  has  the  impact  of  the  degree  of  internationalization  on  firm
performance (Carpano et al., 1994; Contractor et al., 2003; Ruigrok & Wagner, 2003). A
large literature on foreign entry modes has contrasted the performance of firms that entered
new  markets  through  acquisition,  green-field  facilities,  alliances,  licenses,  or  other  entry
modes (Root, 1987; Hennart, 1982; Buckley & Casson, 1996; 1998a, etc.). A substantial
portion of the international business literature focuses on the organization and management
of  multinational  firms.  Issues  addressed  have  included  the  control  and  coordination  of
national subsidiaries, the level of integration across national subsidiaries, and the balance
between global headquarters control and autonomy of national subsidiaries (Doz & Prahalad,
1984; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Martinez & Jarillo, 1989, 1991; Paterson & Brock, 2002). 
The relative importance of the different streams of IB research in recent years can be
discerned from Werner (2002)1, which classifies international management research in top
journals from 1996 to 2000. Of the 271 articles classified, 128 are from JIBS, with SMJ,
AMJ and JoM far behind. As shown in the table below, some 144 of the papers focus on
internationalisation,  104  focus  on  multinational  enterprises,  and  23  focus  on  regulatory
changes and international risk management in the global business environment. The articles
classified are all those that focus on some aspect of international management. Comparative
management  studies  focused  on  cross-cultural  differences  and  foreign  domestic  studies
focused on non-US countries were not included in the classification.
Internationalization 144
Pure internationalization 34
Entry Mode Decisions 33
International Joint Ventures 25





Strategic Alliances and Networks 18
Subsidiary-HQ Relations 18
Subsidiary and Multinational Team Management 20
Expatriate Management 16
Global Business Environment 23
TOTAL 271
2
1 Steve  Werner,  “Recent  Developments  in  International  Management  Research:  A  Review  of  the  20  Top
Management Journals”, Journal of Management 2002, 28 (3) 277-305.The international business literature that does focus on strategy shows particular
patterns as well. A search of the Journal of International Business Studies archives from
1970 to July 2003 yielded 84 papers with the word “strategy” in the abstract. Of these, 27%
focused either on overall international strategy issues such as configuring and coordinating
international  operations,  linking  the  theory  of  the  multinational  to  strategy,  customer  or
market selection, etc. (11 papers), or on core strategy issues such as pricing strategies, generic
strategies,  market  share-performance,  oligopolistic  strategies,  etc.  (12  papers).  The  rest
focused on multinational activities, on international aspects of functional strategies or on
macroeconomics-political  influences  (see  table  below).  The  remaining  papers  formed  a
diverse set that included industry studies (4 papers), links between strategy and mindsets or
beliefs  (4  papers),  and  even  publishing  strategies  for  international  business  researchers
(1 paper) (JIBS Archive, 2003).




Location Decisions  4
Entry Modes 4
Alliances and Joint Ventures 5
International Aspects of Functional Strategies 22




Control and Accounting 2
Manufacturing 1
Information Management 1
Macroeconomics and political issues 11
Miscellaneous 10
TOTAL 84
While  the  research  agenda  was  quite  complex,  the  strategic  framework  was
relatively  simple.  The  world  was  seen  as  the  equilibrium  between  the  two  streams  of
globalization  and  localization.  Technological  change  was  bringing  convergence  in  tastes,
customs  and  products.  However,  implementation  required  some  degree  of  localization  to
respond to local needs and cultures, as well as to benefit from local advantages, be they
strong currency, low raw material costs, low labour cost or even fiscal advantages.
In  recent  years,  many  forces  have  combined  to  change  the  face  of  international
business. Several of these forces are loosely grouped under the rubric of “globalization.”
These include the expansion of global finance and financial markets, the spread of knowledge
facilitated by improved communication, the widespread availability and use of technology,
the active expansion of multinational firms, the decoupling and decentralization of economic
activities within and between firms, the blurring of nationality of multinationals, reductions
in barriers to trade and investment, the increased importance and power of supranational
organizations  such  as  the  European  Union,  and  the  emergence  of  regions  and  regional
identities that transcend borders. Added to this list today would be the rise of electronic
communities  over  the  Internet  and  the  fact  that  nations  comprising  nearly  one  half  of
the world’s population (including China, India, South Africa, the former Eastern bloc, and the
3formerly import substitution driven economies of Latin America) have either entered or have
dramatically  changed  their  relationship  to  the  world  economy  (Enright,  1997,  2000a).  In
some senses, globalization has proceeded to an extent well beyond what Levitt conceived
in his famous article on globalization (Levitt, 1983).
On  the  other  hand,  the  very  importance  of  the  forces  described  above  have
engendered both backlashes and rethinking. The backlash against globalization has taken on
many forms and has forced multinational firms to deal with new political as well as economic
realities. At the same time, the forces have resulted in a renewed focus on issues concerning
international  business  and  the  multinational  firm.  Globalization  has  opened  new  potential
markets  as  it  has  encouraged  the  rise  of  new  competitors.  Increased  competition,  the
emergence of new locations in the international economy, and the ability of firms to slice their
activities ever more thinly has drawn fresh attention to the nature of locational advantages and
disadvantages. As a result, firms are taking a new look at their international strategies. 
To face the realities of the 21st century we need a different paradigm in relation to
IB and International Strategy: a view of the world that goes beyond the tension between
globalization and localization controlled by MNCs. Not surprisingly, one of the areas that
Werner identifies for future research in IB is MNC strategies. We know a lot about MNCs but
not much about how they should define their strategy in a complex globalized environment.
The view of the world we propose is an ecology of places and firms. Firms are not just
local firms vs. MNC firms. We have many different types: local firms, regional firms, firms that
operate in a few countries, centralized firms, networks of firms, etc. Diverse firms, with diverse
characteristics and diverse sources of competitive advantage. At the same time, firms operate in
places whose ecology is even more diverse than the firms themselves. IB is the co-location of
the two ecologies of places and firms.
This is a complex view to grasp. We do not have all the necessary information to do
so yet, although we do have a number of approaches that are moving us in this direction,
breaking the old paradigms and bringing us to the new frontiers in strategy.
The  next  section  introduces  us  to  the  idea  of  semiglobalization.  The  polar  view
between localization and globalization is not enough. The polarity misses the richness in the
ecology of places. Semiglobalization underlies interesting variations in location-specificity
and, as such, is logically essential to the possibility of distinctive content for international
business strategy.
According  to  Prof.  Ghemawat,  given  the  interest  in  location-specificity,  the
fundamental question in international business strategy is, or ought to be, “Why do countries
differ?” He notes several distinct types of dimensions along which countries may differ:
cultural (religion, race, social norms, language…), administrative (political and economic
relationships), geographic, and economic (wealth and income). To deal with this complexity,
he  proposes  that  country  differences  should  be  studied  with  integrative  frameworks  that
include bilateral and multilateral as well as indexical measures, paying particular attention to
the differences that matter most in the particular industry (or industries) under consideration
and  offering  cross-country  perspectives  rather  than  just  deep  but  narrow  perspectives  on
individual countries.
The world is undoubtedly complex. Understanding different places is essential. And
a  key  element  is  local  institutions.  Prof.  Khanna  argues  that  institutional  voids  arise
where specialized  intermediaries  are  absent.  Without  the  information  provided  by  these
4intermediaries, key strategic decisions are more difficult to make, affecting industry analysis,
positioning and sustainability, the key fundamentals of competitive strategy. Firms acting in
different places should be aware of the strategic consequences of institutional voids.
Another key aspect is the need to integrate places into competitive strategy, i.e. use
the  international  dimension  as  a  source  of  competitive  advantage.  We  can  do  this  by
approaching strategy from a competitiveness point of view, as proposed by Prof. Enright. He
suggests  that  competitiveness  be  analyzed  not  by  integrating  boxes  that  only  apply  to
developed countries, but by integrating different levels, from supranational to macro, meso,
micro and firm level. By analyzing all these levels one can reach a better understanding of
firm-based and location-based advantages, essentially co-locating firms and places.
Finally, in our last section, Prof. Hart focuses on a particular application of some of
these ideas, using place as an ingredient for competitive advantage. MNCs have traditionally
focused on serving the top of the pyramid in underdeveloped countries. The central view was
to use products and capabilities that had proved useful in developed countries. However,
adapting to an unfamiliar place requires a new way of thinking. Learning from the difficulties
encountered in serving the bottom of the pyramid can be a way to develop new, untouched
markets and a fantastic opportunity for disruptive innovation.
Taken together, these studies aim to open a new frontier in our understanding of
International Strategy. Any new frontier is full of uncertainties. But we have learned enough
so far to be able to penetrate the unknown and shed new light for managers and companies.
Let’s go deeper into the new frontier.
2. Semiglobalization and Strategy (P. Ghemawat)
In a previous paper in JIBS (Ghemawat, 2003a), I presented evidence indicating that
most measures of cross-border market integration have scaled new heights in the last few
decades but still fall far short of economic theory’s ideal of perfect integration. I called this
state  of  incomplete  cross-border  integration  “semiglobalization”  and  pointed  out  that
this structural condition of intermediate levels of international integration is what affords
room  for  international  business  strategy  to  have  content  that  truly  is  distinctive  from
“mainstream” (single country or location) business strategy. In contrast, the polar possibility
of zero cross-border integration would imply complete international segmentation of output
and input markets, and strategy could presumably be set country by country, using the single-
country tools and frameworks of “mainstream” business strategy2. And at the other pole, with
complete cross-border integration, the single-country approach would, once again, suffice:
the  world  could  simply  be  treated  as  one  big  country  or  melting  pot.  It  is  only  with
semiglobalization that international strategy has the potential for content distinctive from the
single-country case that is the baseline for most strategic thinking.
This essay focuses on the realization of that potential for distinctive content. To set the
stage, it is useful to begin by parsing the field of strategy into the domains depicted in Table 1
(also discussed in more detail in Ghemawat, 2003a). Note the somewhat paradoxical character
5
2 Admittedly, at this polar extreme there would still be room for interesting cross-country comparative research
aimed at correcting for the U.S.-centric approach that continues to pervade most “mainstream” strategic
thinking. But such research should properly be classified as a contribution to single-country strategy, i.e.,
domains 1 or 2 of the matrix in Table 1, rather than domains 3 or 4.of domain 1, mainstream business strategy: by assuming total specificity, it allots the least
attention to actually understanding either business/usage-specificity or location-specificity. As a
result,  we  have  to  look  to  domain  2,  that  of  mainstream  corporate  strategy,  for  interesting
analyses of variations in the extent to which key firm activities, resources or knowledge are
business-specific as opposed to generic in the sense of being fungible across businesses. And
we must also look to domain 3, that of international business strategy, for analyses of variations
in the extent to which activities, resources, knowledge, etcetera are location-specific as opposed
to generic in the sense of being fungible across locations. Domain 4, featuring international
corporate  strategy,  combines  considerations  of  business/usage  specificity  and  location-
specificity. The point of Table 1, however, is not to celebrate the synthesis in domain 4 but,
instead, to make it clear that location-specificity is essential to the possibility of international
strategy  having  distinctive  content.  The  link  back  to  semiglobalization  is  that  with  zero
integration of markets across locations, location-specificity would be at a maximum, and that at
the  other  pole,  with  complete  integration,  location-specificity  would  be  at  a  minimum.
Semiglobalization underlies subtler variations in location-specificity.
Table 1. Strategy Domains 
Source: Ghemawat (2003a).
There are, of course, many ways in which one might think about or study location-
specificity. But one particularly obvious approach parallels the fundamental question that has
proved  fruitful  in  mainstream  business  strategy  –why  do  firms  differ–  by  asking  why
countries or locations differ. In both cases, the focus on firm differences helps differentiate
the  content  of  the  strategy  agenda  from  that  of  economics:  from  industrial  organization
economics in the case of mainstream business strategy and from international economics in
the  case  of  international  business  strategy.  But  once  again,  the  overlay  of  locational
differences is what gives international business strategy its distinctive content. Another way
of making the same point is that the overlay of locational and firm-level differences is the
specific perspective that this essay proposes on the “ecology of places and firms” highlighted
in the introduction to this paper.
Why, apart from the parallel with mainstream business strategy, should the question
of why countries or locations differ be focused on as fundamental in international business
strategy?  First,  it  seems  a  sensible  response  to  the  dearth  of  “big  research  questions”  in
international business that was recently flagged by Buckley (2002, p. 370) in his Presidential
Address to the AIB:
International business has succeeded because it has focused on, in sequence, a
number of big questions, which arise from empirical developments in the world
economy. The agenda is stalled because no such big question has currently been
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LocationWhile one can think up other “big questions” –e.g., the question of why industries
differ and how that matters that is discussed below– the notion of (variations in) location-
specificity  that  underlies  the  question  proposed  here  should,  for  the  conceptual  reasons
discussed above, be expected to be essential to the development of distinctive content for
international strategy.
A  second  and  related  reason  for  focusing  on  the  question  of  why  countries  or
locations  differ  is  that  it  proves  helpful  in  classifying  many  interesting  strands  of  recent
research in international business. The works of the authors in the sections following this one
provide salient examples. To simplify, the next section focuses on cross-country differences
in terms of the presence or absence of specialized intermediaries and the broader stream of
work  on  international  business  of  which  it  forms  part  highlights  institutional  differences
across  countries  (with  specialized  intermediaries  conceptualized  in  terms  of  varieties  of
institutional infrastructure). Section 4 in this paper takes a somewhat different tack but can be
seen as part of a broader research stream on regional strategies, geographic clustering and
other  topics  that  has  helped  bring  the  geographic  dimensions  of  the  differences  between
countries/locations into sharper focus. And section 5 focuses attention on the (very large)
differences in per capita income across countries –or to be more exact, on the very-low-
income  end  of  that  continuum  because  that  is  relatively  understudied.  The  fundamental
question of why countries or locations differ is one way of slotting these diverse research
thrusts in international business into a common frame– as different ways of answering the
same fundamental question. In addition, this question can help international business link to
other fields of study that are tackling complementary issues, e.g., the cross-country corporate
governance  literature  (e.g.,  Rajan  and  Zingales,  1998  and  Beck,  2001).  However,  the
discussion of such linkages goes beyond the scope of this short essay.
The preceding list of possible answers to the question of why countries differ also
suggests  that  the  dimensionality  of  the  range  of  differences  across  countries  is  large.
Dimensionality  is  increased  further  by  the  consideration  that  that  list  is  far  from
comprehensive. Efforts to extend and elaborate the known dimensions of difference across
countries occupy a good chunk of the current international business research agenda, which
makes some sense. But some attention should also be allotted, this essay argues, to the issue
of how to move beyond essentially piecemeal consideration of a large number of individual
dimensions of difference. Some insights into how to proceed can be inferred by focusing on
what is probably the most systematic and successful class of attempts, so far, to integrate the
implications  of  multiple  dimensions  of  difference  for  cross-border  economic  activity:
implementations of the “gravity model” (primarily in international economics).
The gravity model in economics bears a rough resemblance to Newton’s law of
universal gravitation, down to having originally been proposed in the economic context by an
astronomer,  James  Stewart.  The  model  posits  that  economic  interactions  between  two
locations are directly related to the product of their economic mass and inversely related to
the  geographic  distance  between  them  –as  well  as  to  measures  of  distance  along  other
dimensions. Fitted relationships of this sort manage to explain one-half or even two-thirds of
the variation in aggregate bilateral trade between country-pairs. Gravity models have also
been fitted with some success to bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) and even cross-
border equity flows. As a result, fitted gravity models have been described as supplying
“some  of  the  clearest  and  most  robust  empirical  findings  in  economics”  (Leamer  and
Levinsohn, 1995:1384).
At least in the context of trade, it is possible to offer some gravity-based assessments
of how much different types of differences across countries matter, on average, for cross-
border economic activity: see Table 2 for a recent analysis by Ghemawat and Mallick (2003).
7While the precise magnitudes of the estimated coefficients in Table 2 are interesting, what are
even more important are four emergent insights about how to think –and not think– about the
differences across countries:
Table 2. Estimated Effects: A Gravity Model of Bilateral Trade*
Source: Ghemawat and Mallick (2003).
1. Integrative frameworks. The estimates in Table 2 are big enough and distributed
broadly enough to call into question, at least from the strategic perspective, the research
strategy  of  trying  to  establish  that  one  category  of  differences  (e.g.,  institutional,  which
currently seems to be in an ascendant phase: cf., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002)
generally trumps all the rest. Similar considerations also hint at the potential usefulness of a
general framework for thinking about why countries differ as a supplement to specialized
models of individual dimensions of difference. Table 3a presents my own proposal in this
regard, which is implicit in the groupings in Table 2, and which I refer to as the CAGE
framework (see Ghemawat, 2001 for additional details). The acronym is meant to evoke the
Cultural,  Administrative/political/institutional,  Geographic  and  economic  dimensions  of
differences across countries. Others might further unbundle some of the CAGE categories3 or
modify  or  even  recast  them.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  pass  judgment  on  competing
frameworks  for  thinking  about  why  countries  differ  to  make  the  point  that  some such
framework for organizing thinking is likely to prove helpful.
2. Inadequacies of Indexicality. Many of the integrative frameworks that have been
proposed  for  purposes  of  understanding  the  differences  across  countries  (or  locations)
presume  that  countries  can  be  assessed  one-by-one  or  unilaterally  against  a  common
yardstick –possibly calibrated on the basis of the actual population distribution– to yield
meaningful rankings or contrasts. Note that indexicality in this sense encompasses not only
cardinal  indexes  such  as  the  World  Economic  Forum’s  Global  Competitiveness  Indexes
(formerly one, now two) or Transparency International’s Corrruption Perceptions Index but
also  ordinal  ranking  schemes  such  as  Porter’s  “diamond”  framework  for  diagnosing  the
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   -11%
      -1.1%
      -0.2%
   -48%
+125%
     +0.8%
     +0.7%
*Estimates are all significant at the 1% level but are, in many cases, smaller than those
reported in previous studies, apparently due to correction for censoring.
3 If pressed to unbundle the CAGE framework further, I would probably split the administrative category into
institutional precommitments, government policies and interest group politics/political preferences that have
the power to influence policies over time. I would also elaborate further on variations in the usage specificity
of the relevant economic factors, inputs, infrastructure, et cetera. But the acronym would be a problem.industries. But the simplicity of indexicality is purchased at a price: the summarization of an
entire structure in terms of a simple index number or contrast is, inevitably, Procrustean4. For
example,  the  physical  distance  between  country  pairs  cannot  be  represented  in  terms  of
country-by-country index numbers. More broadly, indexicality is inattentive to the bilateral
character of many of the dimensions of difference in Tables 2 and 3a, which suggests that
countries be envisioned as existing in (and even occupying) space in relation to each other
instead  of  as  an  array  along  a  common  yardstick.  In  other  words,  countries  should  be
represented as nodes in a network rather than as a heap of structurally equivalent objects.
Table 3a. The CAGE Framework: Country-Level Analysis
Source: Ghemawat (2001).
The  tendency  to  neglect  this  point  about  bilateral  (or  more  broadly,  relational)
measures is particularly unfortunate because such measures often turn out, at least in gravity
models  of  international  trade,  to  exert  effects  that  are  as  large  if  not  much  larger  than
unilateral  measures’.  Having  made  that  distinction,  it  is  useful  to  add  that  unilateral
influences –i.e., influences specific to individual countries rather than to country-pairs– are
by no means incompatible with careful consideration of the bilateral influences to which
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4 For a somewhat more extended discussion of indexicality in a broader social science context, see Abbott
(2001), especially pp. 11-12 and chapter 6.unilateral measure of isolation (or integration), which captures unilateral country-specific
attributes  that  generally  decrease  (or  increase)  a  country’s  involvement  in  cross-border
economic  activities  and  which  can  be  treated  as  a  common  component  of  that  country’s
distances  from  other  countries.  For  example,  really  isolated  countries  (characterized  by
unique, ingrown cultures, closed administrative policies, physical remoteness, etc.) can be
thought of as being relatively distant from everywhere else.
3. Industry Context. Common sense suggests that industry context has a profound
impact on how much a specific type of difference across locations matters in a particular
context.  For  example,  cross-border  flows  of  cement  are  more  sensitive  to  the  effects  of
geographic distance than cross-border flows of satellite TV programming, but less subject to
cultural (as in linguistic) differences or administrative restrictions due to political-sensitivity.
Such variation in industry attributes or context has an enormous influence on the content of
effective  international  strategies  in  the  two  settings:  compare  Ghemawat  and  Thomas’s
(2003) research case on Cemex in the cement industry with Ghemawat’s (2004) research case
on  Star  TV  in  the  Asian  satellite  TV  industry.  More  generally,  disaggregated  gravity
modeling confirms that such industry-level variations in the effects of given differences are
important  enough  that  they  must  be  attended  to  (e.g.,  Head  and  Mayer  2000,  2002;
Ghemawat and Mallick, 2003). Attention to industry contextuality helps pare down some of
the complexity induced by multidimensional (point #1) and relational as well as unilateral
(point #2) measures of differences among locations. And it suggests that the ways in which
industries  differ  from  each  other,  and  how  that  matters,  constitute  another  fruitfully
fundamental “big question” in international business strategy, just as they do in mainstream
business strategy. In the terms used in the introduction to this paper, while the ecology of
firms and locations is often discussed in a general way, applications often require that it be
looked at from the perspective of specific industries. For an illustrative attempt to relate the
salience  of  different  categories  of  differences  across  countries  identified  by  the  CAGE
framework to industry characteristics, see Table 3b.
Table 3b. The CAGE Framework: Industry-Level Analysis
Source: Ghemawat (2001).
104. Implications for Strategy. In  pondering  the  implications  for  firm  strategy  of
focusing on the differences across countries or locations, it is useful to start, once again, with
a parallel drawn from mainstream business strategy. While the question of why firms differ is
a good starting point in the mainstream context, it is far from a good stopping point: how
those differences matter is an essential follow-up question to the extent that there is any
interest in devising implications for firm strategy. Mainstream business strategy has made
some progress in this regard in recent decades because, while it takes the differences across
firms seriously, it has generally managed to refrain from overemphasizing them to an extent
that  might  push  the  clock  back  to  the  old  days  of  business  policy,  in  which  firms  were
essentially seen as unique and analytical attention to competitive interactions and pressures
was quite limited. By analogy, international business strategy should take the differences
across countries seriously, but probably not to the point of focusing on local variation to the
exclusion of all else. In other words, it would be useful to be able to offer firms that cross
borders advice that goes beyond “Never underestimate the importance of local knowledge”
–even  if  one  believes  that  many  firms  could  still  benefit  from  taking  local  variation  or
knowledge  more  seriously.  Or  to  use  the  terminology  originally  introduced  to  the  social
sciences  by  Pike  (1954),  we  need  “etic”  knowledge  –the  cross-country  perspective  of  a
detached  observer–  as  well  as  “emic”  knowledge  –the  deep  but  narrow  single-country
perspective of a native participant5. Ghemawat (2003a) elaborates on some specific proposals
for making progress towards the etic objective, including appropriately broad identification
of variables that embody location-specificity, and explicit recognition of arbitrage strategies
that  capitalize  on  the  remaining  differences  across  countries  as  well  as  strategies  of
adaptation or aggregation that try to cope with such differences while seeking to encash
similarities as economies of scale or scope. The arbitrage strategy, studied earlier by Kogut
(1985a; 1985b), among a few others, is reconceptualized in terms of a broader range of
differences across countries and elaborated on in Ghemawat (2003b), who also discusses how
it differs from adaptation/aggregation as a strategic approach.
In summary, this short essay started out with the observations that semiglobalization
is  both  characteristic  empirically  of  the  level  of  cross-border  integration  of  markets  and
essential logically to the possibility of distinctive content for international business strategy.
Semiglobalization underlies interesting variations in location-specificity and, in parallel with
mainstream business strategy’s fundamental question of “why firms differ,” directs attention
to “why countries or locations differ” as the fundamental (overlay) question in international
business  strategy.  Attempts  to  answer  this  question,  particularly  on  the  basis  of  gravity
models of international trade, suggest that the differences across countries must be addressed
with  integrative  frameworks  that  go  beyond  indexical  measures  of  difference  to  include
bilateral and multilateral ones, pay explicit attention to the industry context (which suggests a
third  fundamental  question,  “why  industries  differ”),  and  attempt  to  offer  cross-country
perspectives on firm strategy. The intent behind ranging so broadly in a short piece has been
to encourage additional discussion of and research into foundational issues in international
business strategy that seem sorely understudied.
3. Institutional voids (T. Khanna)
Understanding  location-specificity  is,  therefore,  fundamental  to  International
Business. This section shows that institutional voids –defined below as the paucity of the
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5 According to Pike, “The etic view is cross-cultural in that its units are derived by comparing many systems
and by abstracting from them units which are synthesized into a single scheme which is then analytically
applied as a single system. The emic view is monocultural with its units derived from the internal functional
relations of only one individual or culture at a time.” specialized intermediaries needed to consummate transactions– are central to understanding
such  location-specificity,  and  also  to  understand  the  nature  of  cross-border  transactions.
Finally,  I  argue  that  scholars  cannot  analyze  the  sustainability  of  strategies  commonly
discussed  in  the  IB  field  without  endogenizing  the  role,  and  evolution,  of  specialized
intermediaries.
What are institutional voids?
Institutional voids occur when specialized intermediaries are absent. Intermediaries
are economic entities that insert themselves between a potential buyer and a potential seller in
an  attempt  to  bring  them  together  by  reducing  potential  transaction  costs  (Coase,  1937;
Williamson, 1985). 
To appreciate this concept’s importance, consider a simple stylized market where
there is no role for a specialized intermediary. Then consider adding on a variety of real-
world features, each of which ensures the need for (a different kind of) an intermediary.
Two  individuals  engaged  in  a  barter  transaction  involving  the  simplest  possible
items in an erstwhile primitive economy –a simple article of clothing in exchange for some
food. The uses of the items in question are reasonably well specified; that is, there is little
ambiguity about the value of the items in question. Further, the exchange has the property of
simultaneous satisfaction of the wants of the two individuals. There is no role for a third
party to intermediate this transaction.
a) First, consider what happens if the exchange is subject to a time-lag. That is, A
has the clothing, but B promises to give the food in exchange later on. Now there
is a potential need to ensure that B does not renege ex post and that, if this
happens, there is some redress available to A. The redressing mechanism is an
example of a contract guarantor that intermediates the transaction. It gives A the
confidence to transact and reduces costly bargaining.
b) Second, imagine that the items being exchanged are not simple, but require some
third-party expertise in evaluating quality. For the transaction to not break down
due to the classic “lemons problem” (Akerlof, 1970), a certification mechanism
is  needed.  This  is  an  example  of  an  information-providing  specialized
intermediary.
c) Third, consider that A wishes to transact but cannot find B. Then it might need
the services of a different kind of information intermediary that matches potential
buyers and sellers.
It  is  straightforward  to  see  why,  in  the  absence  of  intermediaries  of  the  sort
mentioned above, commerce will, quite simply, collapse. Thus, understanding what happens
when there is a paucity of specialized intermediation is fundamental to understanding all
manner of commerce.
Further note that, while the language used above is that of ‘goods,’ it applies with
equal force to all kinds of markets, including markets for talent, capital, ideas, etcetera. Thus,
talent is particularly hard to evaluate, requiring the existence of labor market intermediaries
like  search  firms  and  business  schools.  The  patent  system  facilitates,  at  least  partially,
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alluded to above, since it typically involves an investor giving something in return for the
(uncertain) promise of a future return.
In addition to being a simple lens through which a wide variety of phenomena can
be interpreted, the idea of institutional voids points to a variety of un-researched phenomena
that are relevant to scholars of international business. In what follows, I will first consider
topics  conventionally  studied  by  the  JIBS community  –for  simplicity,  divided  between
within-country and cross-country issues– and then comment briefly on new research frontiers
suggested by this lens. Note that ‘country’ is used as a summary expression for a geographic
unit of analysis, but the reasoning applies equally to sub-national or supra-national units of
analysis.
Within-country topics
Scholars  of  international  business  have  long  been  concerned  about  tailoring
strategies to particular contexts (Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). By
viewing contexts through the lens of specialized institutions, it becomes clear that contexts
vary widely. Further, it is not difficult to imagine that the choice of which activities (Porter
1985) to perform, and the choice of how to perform these, may be quite different if the
services  provided  by  specialized  intermediaries  are  missing.  In  searching  for  managerial
talent, for instance, companies will have to perform extensive screening of outside pools of
talent, that is, assuming they can locate and identify such a talent pool in the first instance.
Raising  external  capital  requires  credibly  convincing  external  capital  providers  that  the
money that is being sought will be used in the way that is intended. This would be incredibly
difficult if there were no independent auditors to certify that this was indeed so, and if there
were no recourse mechanisms available to investors in the face of often unavoidable after-
the-fact disputes. Thus, the lens of specialized intermediation points inexorably to the idea of
context-dependence of strategy.
One can see how context-dependence affects both industry analysis and positioning
(Porter, 1980, 1985). Consider industry analysis first (Khanna, 2002). Porter’s five-forces
framework is about identifying which economic constituency –buyers of a product, suppliers,
or the firms that make the product– have the greatest economic power and, thus, walk away
with the maximal rents. But the way in which this division of the pie occurs depends very
much on (typically unstated) assumptions regarding specialized intermediation. For example,
for talent to bargain away rents, it matters whether it has access to collective representation
(unions, for example). It also matters whether capital market intermediaries are present that
can facilitate talent leaving and starting its own entrepreneurial venture. Thus, the bargaining
power  of  this  particular  (important)  supplier  depends  crucially  on  these  specialized
intermediaries’ presence or absence.
Khanna  and  Rivkin  (2001b)  have  shown,  in  a  sample  of  40+  countries  over  a
decade,  that  industries  do  not  appear  to  be  structured  similarly.  They  base  this  on  their
demonstration that the rank order of performance (measured variously) of industries varies
quite  drastically  from  country  to  country.  Further,  it  varies  more  when  their  (admittedly
crude) proxies for specialized intermediaries indicate sizeable differences in context. 
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intermediation.  This  is  easily  seen  in  studies  of  business  groups  in  emerging  economies.
Diversified structures that are believed to be value-destroying in some countries (Montgomery,
1994; Lang & Stulz, 1993) are value-enhancing in others (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna &
Rivkin,  2001a).  This  is  because  the  internal  markets  available  to  diversified  entities  are
relatively  more  useful  when  specialized  intermediaries  are  absent  and  the  functioning  of
external markets is thus compromised6. 
An  extreme  illustration  of  the  dependence  of  positioning  and  sustainability  on
institutional voids is provided by the actions of firms catering to the world’s most under-
served  populations  in  the  ‘base  of  the  pyramid’  (see  Section  5  below).  A  reasonable
characterization  of  such  regions  would  focus  on  the  complete  absence  of  specialized
intermediation. The hard infrastructure –roads, electricity, communications technology– is
missing; so, equally insidiously, is the soft infrastructure needed to locate possible transaction
partners,  and  to  credibly  contract  with  them.  Distributing  consumer  products  to  the  vast
expanses of the inner reaches of the Amazon or the Mekong Delta, for example, has to rely
on innovative franchising-style agreements with distributors who might bicycle over large
terrains or distribute small quantities of products via waterways. It is not difficult to see that
such a distribution system, itself a result of the paucity of (hard and soft) infrastructure,
would be positioned quite differently than a distribution system for comparable products in a
developed country. Clearly, also, the sustainability of such a position would depend on the
persistence of institutional voids, an issue which is intertwined with actions taken by the firm
(see comments on endogeneity of institutional voids below).
This influence of institutional voids on firms’ choices appears resilient from the little
evidence of which we are aware. In the realm of systematic empirical inquiry, a study of
positioning by Chilean firms suggests that the active program of market development in that
country took the better part of a generation to atrophy business-group-affiliation advantages –
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6 Whereas one can posit conceptual links between institutional voids and sustainability, I know of no formal
work  that  establishes  whether  positions  are  sustained  for  differentially  long  periods  based  on  ambient
institutional voids.study demonstrated continued ability by Chile’s largest business groups to continue to buck
this  aggregate  trend  and  add  value  by  compensating  for  institutional  voids  (Khanna  and
Palepu  1999,  2000b)7.  Anecdotal  evidence  having  to  do  with  attempts  to  eliminate
institutional voids is consistent with the flavor of these studies. Perhaps the most robust of
these  is  the  difficulty  experienced  by  scores  of  countries  around  the  world  to  generate
markets for risk capital to spur entrepreneurship. 
Cross-country topics
This sub-section considers the much-studied (by the JIBS community and others)
phenomenon of multinationals (and the associated phenomenon of FDI). It also considers
less-studied phenomena of cross-border flows of various factor inputs.
Multinationals can add value in the face of cross-border institutional voids (Foley,
2002; Khanna and Palepu, 2002). The particular institutional void thus filled might arise from
the absence of executive search firms, financial analysts, a cross-border dispute resolution
mechanism, or a global logistics capability. The multinational is in the business of reducing
information asymmetries and guaranteeing contracts –in markets for products, talent, capital
and ideas. Conceptually, in addition to the usual sources of information problems in any
economy,  cross-border  transactions  are  accompanied  by  certain  specific  sources  of
information  costs.  These  might  arise  because  of  cultural  and  language  differences,  for
instance,  or  from  differences  in  accounting  standards  or  other  (imperfectly  transparent)
business practices. Further, the absence of a cross-border fiat authority (of the sort of a well-
functioning state within a country) complicates the resolution of cross-border disputes.
Consider, for example, intellectual property rights. An entrepreneur with a path-
breaking mousetrap with worldwide applicability can patent her invention under the U.S.
system, securing property rights worldwide. Even if the patentee had the resources to ensure
that these property rights are respected worldwide, she would still have to contract with
independent providers of a range of complementary assets. Production facilities in various
countries  to  make  the  mousetrap  and  branding  and  logistics  and  distribution  agents  to
disseminate the product efficiently would be needed to realize a return on the invention. On
the other hand, if the multinational were the patent holder, several of these functions could be
internalized. 
Similarly, multinationals might serve to guarantee quality of goods and services that
are moving cross-border, when alternative mechanisms to provide information about, and
police  quality  of,  such  goods  and  services  are  under-developed.  Samsung’s  brand-name
foreshadows  its  manufacturing  prowess,  which  translates  into  reliability  of  its  consumer
electronics and other items commonly available around the world. 
A second challenge related to the management of multinationals has to do with the
extent to which multinationals should localize their business model to suit the particulars of
country context. The JIBS community has studied a variant of this problem extensively by
studying  the  resolution  of  the  centralization/decentralization  debate.  That  is,  extensively
locally  sensitive  business  models  are  probably  more  consistent  with  a  decentralized
management  structure  with  emphasis  on  local  autonomy.  For  our  purposes,  this  issue  is
isomorphic  to  the  discussion  of  context-dependence  of  strategy  from  the  within-country
issues sub-section above. 
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7 The  field  study  also  reached  similar  conclusions  about  Indian  business  groups  during  the  several  years
following deregulation of cross-border activity (1991-1997).Within the cross-border arena, the institutional voids lens directs us to consider
questions that have been under-studied by the JIBS community. I suggest three categories of
such questions here.
a) With  whom  do  multinationals  compete?  The  conventional  answer  to  this
question is ‘with each other’ or ‘with local, that, is, single-country firms.’ But
they compete with all other ways in which there is cross-border movement of
factor inputs or end products and services. The extent to which multinationals are
substitutes for alternative ends to the same goal –e.g. consider a U.S. investor
entrusting funds to a mutual fund that invests in Latin America, versus investing
in a U.S.-based multinational that then maintains operations in Latin America–
depends on the configuration of cross-border institutional voids. Similarly, the
‘outside option’ of specialized talent employed by a multinational is to use cross-
border  specialized  intermediaries  (websites  that  provide  information  on
worldwide  opportunities,  search  firms  that  facilitate  matching  of  talent  with
opportunity  across  borders,  relocation  agencies  that  accomplish  the  move)  to
ensure that her talent is used by the highest bidder even if the latter is in a remote
geography.
b) What effect do multinationals have on context? This is a question that has some
history  of  discussion  in  the  JIBS community,  and  has  received  increasing
attention in the last few years (Aitken & Harrison in AER). But the scope for
analysis  is  much  wider  than  the  productivity-spillover-measurement  guise  in
which this problem is addressed8. Consider the effects of multinational presence
on  the  presence  of  local  capital  market  intermediaries.  To  the  extent  that
multinationals, typically listed in their home country exchanges, cause trading to
move offshore, the demand for services of local analysts is lowered. This affects
the viability of the business model of the analyst, and, ultimately, affects the
efficiency  with  which  the  local  capital  market  might  work.  One  can  posit
mechanisms  with  positive  externalities  as  well.  The  channel  of  the  effect  to
which I wish to draw attention is the economic engine underlying specialized
intermediation  and  how  it  operates,  competitively  or  cooperatively,  with
multinationals. Research on this issue will help us understand the feedback loop
from multinationals to context.
c) Moving outside the realm of multinationals, but squarely within the realm of
cross-border issues, how should we understand cross-border flows of talent and
people  and  ideas  beyond  simply  measuring  their  (lack  of)  incidence?  My
contention is that understanding cross-border intermediaries will move forward
this  research  agenda.  Especially  given  the  forecasted  magnification  of  cross-
border movement of individuals due to demographic changes in the developed
and developing world in the coming few decades, this is an issue of paramount
importance. Further, the study of hot money, another issue related to cross-border
factor  mobility,  can  also  be  understood  as  resulting  from  a  paucity  of  cross-
border intermediaries. The connection here is that herd behavior, of the sort that
results in money flowing in or out of a country with the speed that earns it the
epithet ‘hot,’ occurs in the absence of specific information regarding investment
opportunities.
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8 Outside the realm of economic reasoning that informs this section, the issue of effects of multinationals is
one  that  continues  to  receive  much  attention.  For  example,  do  multinationals  compromise  national
sovereignty, do multinationals crowd out local culture, etcetera?The Endogenous Evolution of Intermediaries
Much of the literature on transaction costs has the flavor of such costs being ‘given.’
They are present as a result of underlying characteristics of the ‘technology’ (that governs
exchange) in question. The institutional voids lens causes one to look upon this conventional
focus  with  some  suspicion.  If  transaction  costs  result  from  the  paucity  of  specialized
intermediaries, and if one thinks of these intermediaries as having their own business models,
it follows that the evolution of transaction costs can be understood better if we study the
industrial organization of specialized intermediation. Why do the ‘industries’ of analysts,
business  schools,  and  executive  search  firms  look  the  way  they  do?  The  endogenous
emergence  of  specialized  intermediaries,  whose  presence  or  absence  is  the  proximate
determinant of ambient transaction costs, has received much less attention than it deserves
(see Spulber 1996 for some attempts in this direction).
For example, think of an executive search firm as an economic entity that helps
bring together (intermediates between, so to speak) supply of talent (executives) and demand
for  talent  (firms).  Notice  that  the  intermediary  is  itself  a  firm,  and  has  its  own  industry
structure  and  its  own  considerations  regarding  positioning  and  sustainability.  Think,  for
example, of how the executive search industry is structured in the U.S. (Khanna, Khurana
and  Palepu,  1999).  There  is  a  premium  end  occupied  by  the  likes  of  Russell  Reynolds,
SpencerStuart  and  others,  a  more  mass-market  segment  dominated  by  Korn/Ferry  and
Heidrick & Struggles, and an internet-search segment with the likes of Monster.com. It turns
out to be virtually impossible to think about how the possibility of efficient cross-border
movement of talent will evolve without thinking through the business decisions of these
specialized intermediaries.
As another example, consider an economy dominated by business groups. These
groups rely on internal markets to promote new ventures, a phenomenon that is a response to
the absence of external markets. But the very existence of the groups ensures that specialized
intermediaries,  not  seeing  a  demand  for  their  services,  do  not  enter.  Thus,  the  situation
perpetuates itself. A reasonable conjecture, awaiting empirical verification, is that groups
might have static efficiency gains, but dynamic efficiency losses (Khanna, 2000).
But the emergence of intermediaries is more than just an economic issue. Consider
investment  into  China  and  India.  China  is  characterized  today  by  heavy  investment  by
multinationals,  India  more  by  vibrant  domestically-owned  private  enterprise  (Huang  and
Khanna, 2003). Intertwined with this equilibrium outcome is the fact that the specialized
intermediaries  needed  to  disseminate  risk  capital  to  would-be  entrepreneurs  is  far  more
developed in India than it is in China. In the latter, multinationals generally do not need
domestic sources of risk capital, since, in their role as cross-border intermediaries, they rely
on cash-flows from operations around the world. But, stepping away from the economics,
consider  why  differences  in  such  equilibria  might  have  arisen  in  the  first  instance.  The
government in China has gone out of its way to lay out the welcome mat for multinationals
–thus partially obviating its need to rely on domestically owned private enterprise– whereas
India’s government has not done so. Understanding why this is so requires understanding the
incentives and ideologies of the Chinese state (at the center and in the provinces) as well as
the messy coalition politics of modern India (Huang and Khanna, 2003).
174. The Primitives, Levels of Analysis, and International Business (M. Enright)
International  business,  by  definition,  is  about  the  interaction  of  firms  and
geographies. The present analysis suggests that international business research can benefit
from work that helps us focus on the “primitives” that drive firm-based and geography-based
success,  introduces  new  economic  and  geographic  actors  to  the  analysis,  and  organizes
critical research questions according to some relatively simple frameworks for analysis.
The Primitives: Activities, Resources, and Knowledge
The strategy literature tells us that sources of advantage at the firm level are found in
activities, resources, and knowledge. The activity-based view of the firm posits that firm
performance is influenced by the way they perform activities, the efficiency and effectiveness
of  those  activities,  and  combinations  or  systems  of  activities  (Porter,  1985;  1996).  The
resource-based view of the firm posits that firm performance is heavily influenced by the
rents that the firm can earn from its stock of resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986,
1991; Peteraf, 1993). The knowledge-based view of the firm posits that firm performance is
influenced by the ability of the firm to create and exploit firm-specific knowledge (Spender,
1996; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1998). While it should be obvious that these views of the firm
are  not  mutually  exclusive,  researchers  in  the  different  schools  tend  to  downplay  the
importance of the others, and rarely bring the different features of the firm together into what
we might call the “ARK” view of strategy (Enright, 2002a) in which activities, resources, and
knowledge are combined to create firm-based advantages (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. The “ARK” Model of Firm-Based and Location-Based Advantage
Source: Enright (2002a).
Similarly, the economy of a nation or region can be described as bundles of activities,
resources, and knowledge bases. An activity-based view of geographies posits that there are
some economic activities that might take place outside or partially outside any individual firm,
but tied to a particular location (marketplace seeking). A resource-based view of geographies
posits that there are resources that may be specific to particular locations rather than any
individual firm. A knowledge-based view of geographies posits that there are knowledge bases
that might be outside the firm that are tied to particular geographies. Just as they can provide
competitive advantages to firms, activities, resources, and knowledge can provide competitive
advantages to locations as well. One difference is that the activities, resources, and knowledge
that are internal to an area and that might influence firm performance can be rather broad,
incorporating natural conditions, institutions, mixes of firms and industries, and other features
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Knowledgeinternational business scholars is one that traces activities, resources, and knowledge, as well
as their interaction, over the appropriate geographies. Of course, this leaves the question of
what  exactly  are  the  appropriate  geographies  over  which  we  should  examine  activities,
resources, and knowledge that create value for business (Enright, 1998; Enright, 2002a).
The three different views of the firm also have analogs in the international business
literature.  An  activity-based  view  of  the  multinational  firm  has  been  proposed  by  Porter
(1986) and Yip (1995). To these authors, the most important aspects of international business
are  the  configuration  and  coordination  of  firm  activities  across  nations  and  regions.  A
resource-based view of the multinational firm posits that the multinational has resources that
can be best leveraged through foreign investment (Vernon, 1992; Dunning, 1993; Caves,
1996). A knowledge-based view of the multinational firm posits that the multinational firm
has knowledge that it exploits across international markets (Buckley and Casson, 1976) and
that the process of internationalization itself is a knowledge-intensive activity (Johansson
and Vahlne, 1977; Kogut and Zander, 1993). Dunning (2000) and Doz et al. (2001) have
begun  to  bring  these  views  of  the  multinational  together  in  describing  the  emergence  of
multinational  strategies  that  use  their  activities  to  link  important  geographically-based
sources of knowledge and resources together. However, there is still little work that explicitly
tests hypotheses that link the three “primitives” of strategy together explicitly into an “ARK”
model of the multinational firm (Enright, 2002a).
Levels of Analysis
In addition to the issue of what “primitives” might be the subject of international
business research, there also is the issue of the appropriate levels of analysis. Historically, the
strategy literature has emphasized the influence of industry-level and firm-level features on
performance. There is a long tradition of research going back to Schmalensee (1985) that
tries to decompose the variation in performance of individual business units into business
segment, industry, and corporate level effects. The studies in this vein generally conclude that
all  three  levels  have  significant  influences,  though  they  vary  in  terms  of  the  relative
magnitudes  of  the  effects  (see  Rumelt,  1991;  Bowman  and  Helfat,  2001;  McGahan  and
Porter, 2002; Hawawini et al., 2003).
Some studies use a four-digit SIC or equivalent level definition of “industry,” while
others use a three-digit or even two-digit definition. Besides the well-known issues that arise
in using SIC-type classifications, the different definitions actually correspond to different
economic or business entities. While the four-digit level already tends to be larger than a
strategically distinct industry, the three and two digit levels represent entire sets of related
industries. Thus evidence of an “industry” effect at the three or two-digit levels is actually
evidence of a “meso” level effect on performance rather than a “micro” level effect. 
Such results are very much in the spirit of recent work on industrial and regional
clusters (Enright, 1998; 2003). The simplest definition of industrial clusters is that they are
groups of firms in the same and related industries, including buyers, suppliers, and industries
related through shared resources or activities. Regional clusters are industrial clusters that are
focused in a particular geographic area. While interest in regional clusters has mostly focused
on their potential to support economic development, increasingly they are becoming a focus
of  interest  for  firm  strategy  and  international  business.  There  is  increasing  evidence  that
industry clusters can positively influence the innovative and financial performance of firms,
as well as firm investment decisions (Audretsch, 2000; Enright, 2000b; Dunning, 2000). This
is not surprising, given the long-recognized influence of suppliers, buyers, and spillovers
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1988). All this suggests that the industry cluster or regional cluster also should be a valid
level of analysis for international business researchers.
A large portion of existing international business research focuses on the nation as a
unit  of  analysis.  In  addition,  recent  efforts  in  the  strategy  literature  to  decompose  the
variation in firm performance have tried to isolate the impact of national differences as well
as  firm  and  industry  differences  (Hawawini  et  al.,  forthcoming).  However,  distinctions
among nations remain peripheral to much of the strategy literature and strategy practice,
which is perhaps one reason why firms seem to be blindsided by differences in markets and
business practices, public policies, macroeconomics, and institutional environments. When
such features are addressed in the strategy literature, they often are viewed as add-ons to
traditional  strategy  frameworks  (Narayanan  and  Fahey,  2001)  and,  therefore,  outside  the
normal course of analysis.
The traditional geographic units addressed in the international business literature are
national subsidiaries and markets, and global headquarters and markets (Paterson and Brock,
2002).  Rugman  (2000)  and  Rugman  and  Verbeke  (2001),  however,  point  out  that  most
international trade and investment flows are within large, supranational “regions”, such as the
Americas,  Europe,  and  the  Asia-Pacific,  and  show  that  many  of  the  world’s  largest
manufacturing and service industries are characterized by (supranational) regional rather than
global production or activity systems. Reasons include the development of regional trade
blocs,  limits  to  global  economies  of  scale,  regional  aggregation  and  scale  economies,
communications technologies that facilitate management on a regional basis, the need to
serve customers operating on a regional basis, regional differences in customers and culture,
and the “tyranny of time zones” that facilitates management on a regional basis (Lehrer and
Asakawa, 1999; Enright, forthcoming). In addition, firm performance in a given nation is
increasingly influenced by multilateral organizations (such as the World Trade Organization
and the IMF), international financial flows (which can cause or exacerbate macroeconomic
booms and busts), and the strategies of foreign multinational firms (Brewer and Young, 2000;
Chia, 2000; Enright, 2000a). This indicates that there is a supranational level of analysis that
also can be critical to firm performance.
The literature suggests that firm effects, industry effects, cluster effects, national
effects, and supranational effects all influence firm performance. The trouble is that in much
of the strategy literature, these additional levels of analysis are not integrated into a single,
organizing framework, but are used as add-ons to traditional strategy analysis. As a result,
strategy  research  and  process  tend  to  have  blind  spots  that  only  become  obvious  in  the
aftermath of financial or business crises. 
An Organizing Framework
What is clear from the above discussion is that work on firm strategy is having a
substantial  influence  on  international  business  research.  However,  we  have  lacked
frameworks  that  allow  us  to  organize  the  work  that  has  been  done  and  help  us  chart  a
direction for future work. 
A useful framework to carry this out is found in Figures 2 and 3. In this framework,
performance at any level of analysis is a function of drivers at five levels: firm level drivers,
industry level drivers, cluster level drivers, national or regional level drivers, and global or
supranational level drivers. Firm level drivers include the strategies, activities, resources,
20knowledge, organisation, management, and governance structures of firms. Micro or industry
level drivers include the nature of competition and cooperation in the given industry, policies
that are specific to the industry, and skills and capabilities that are specific to an industry.
Meso or cluster level drivers include inputs such as infrastructure, materials, components,
and capital goods; the linkages between suppliers and buyers; the nature of local demand;
spillovers  from  related  industries;  and  policies  designed  to  enhance  cluster  development.
Macro or national level drivers include macroeconomic conditions, government policies at
the  national  and  regional  levels,  and  aspects  of  society,  including  goals,  interest  groups,
agendas, and social issues. Meta or supranational level drivers include international financial
flows, the influence of foreign governments, the impact of multilateral agencies such as the
World Trade Organisation, links with other economies outside the nation, the strategies of
foreign multinational firms, and (supranational) regional linkages (Enright, 2002b).
Figure 2. Levels of Analysis
Source: Enright (2000a, 2002b).
Figure 3. Drivers of Business and Economic Performance





















































Meso InstitutionsThe key to using this simple tool is to recognize that, in today’s economy, forces at
each level influence performance at every level. Firm performance is clearly influenced by
firm level drivers, micro or industry level drivers, meso or cluster level drivers, macro or
national level drivers, and meta or supranational level drivers. Macro or national economic
performance is clearly influenced by supranational or meta level drivers, meso or cluster
level  drivers,  micro  or  industry  level  drivers,  and  firm  level  drivers.  And  so  on.  The
framework is best viewed as a set of questions that ensure that our analysis is complete,
rather than a recipe for firms or for national economies. It helps us identify the interactive
forces and strategies that co-evolve with technology, tastes, and competition (as in Lewin
et al., 1999).
Using the Framework
Detailed explication of the use of this framework is beyond the scope of this article,
though a brief example will provide some of the spirit of its use for examining national
economies and firm strategies. 
The emergence of Nokia, the Finnish telecommunications equipment company, is
usually portrayed as a firm-based phenomenon and firm level drivers have been an extremely
important part of the story. New leadership dramatically shifted Nokia’s strategy, narrowing
its industry scope by divesting underperforming units, revamping its positioning to that of a
technology and design-driven company, overhauling its activity-resource-knowledge mix to
match  the  strategy,  and  changing  the  financial  and  governance  structures  by  opening  up
shareholdings  to  international  investors.  At  the  industry level,  competition  on  standards
among a limited number of lead firms has been supplemented by cooperation among some
firms in standards debates, cross-licensing, alliances, and supply arrangments. At the cluster
level, Finland exhibited early demand for mobile services, including the world’s first GSM
network,  which  helped  stimulate  the  development  of  suppliers  and  input  providers
around Nokia. These developments have fostered investments in education and training both
by Nokia and authorities where it has located. 
At  the  macro level,  Finnish  policy  that  opened  up  competition  in
telecommunications paved the way for the development of Nokia’s first GSM customer.
Nokia  also  was  influenced  by  Finland’s  decision  to  enter  the  EU,  the  macroeconomic
shift in Finland in the 1990s, and national efforts to create a knowledge economy. At the
supranational or meta level, Nokia benefited from access to the Soviet Union for its pre-GSM
businesses, the Nordic countries’ decision to settle on a single mobile telecommunications
standard, the subsequent European decision to select the same (GSM) standard, the opening of
telecommunications  markets  around  the  world  (which  provided  customers),  and  the  wide
penetration  of  GSM  systems  worldwide.  Nokia  clearly  has  been  influenced  by  firm level
drivers, industry or micro level drivers, cluster or meso level drivers, national or macro
level drivers, and supranational or meta level drivers (Enright, 2002b; Häikio, 2002). 
A Research Agenda
The  above  discussion  provides  the  outlines  of  an  international  business  research
agenda with several basic features. One is an explicit focus on levels of analysis and a focus
on new economic actors. Recent research suggests that firms and nations are not the only
relevant levels of analysis, but that industries, clusters, subnational regional economies, and
supranational  regional  economies  also  have  an  important  influence  on  firm  performance.
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intermediate levels that are equally, and in some cases more, important. 
A second feature is a focus on a given set of primitives. The present discussion
suggests that a firm can be defined as the bundle of activities, resources, and knowledge that
are internal to the firm, with all three being essential to firm success. Similarly, the economy
of  a  city,  region,  or  nation  can  be  defined  as  the  bundle  of  activities,  resources,  and
knowledge that are internal to the location, with all three being essential to economic success.
Of course, both firms and locations should be viewed as open systems in the sense that
locations can benefit from activities, resources, and knowledge that exist outside the location,
but are linked to the firm’s operations in the region, and firms can benefit from activities,
resources,  and  knowledge  that  exist  outside  the  firm,  but  are  linked  to  the  firm  through
markets, spillovers, and other interdependencies. 
The third feature is that a focus on firm level drivers, industry level drivers, cluster
level  drivers,  national  level  drivers,  and  supranational  drivers  can  provide  an  organizing
framework for business and economic performance at all of the relevant levels. Analysis that
does not encompass all these levels of analysis is bound to be incomplete. This is highlighted
in other sections of this paper. Sections 3 and 5 both highlight national-level features that
need  to  be  linked  with  firm  strategy  in  order  to  better  understand  the  opportunities  and
challenges that companies face in international business, The present framework shows how
many other combinations or interactions also can be important areas of inquiry beyond those
highlighted specifically in this paper.
The payoff to the features of the present analysis will come in research that focuses
on  the  interaction  of  new  actors  and  new  geographic  levels  of  analysis.  Discussions  of
the geographic  scope  of  competition  and  strategy  benefit  from  understanding  the  forces
of globalization  and  “semi-globalization.”  The  global  headquarters-national  subsidiary
paradigm  becomes  much  richer  when  one  incorporates  subnational  and  supranational
regional strategies and organizations into the analysis. The firm location decision becomes
much richer when we contemplate the placement of individual activities in specific locations
to  take  advantage  of  specific  firm  and  location-based  resources  and  knowledge.  Firm
management  and  coordination  decisions  become  much  richer  when  the  challenge  is  to
coordinate learning and resource development across geographically and culturally dispersed
locations  in  an  integrated  fashion.  The  discussion  of  firm-based  sources  of  advantage  is
enhanced by understanding that firm strategy is influence by a range of national conditions,
including “institutional voids.” Similarly, discussions of the opportunity sets for firms are
enhanced by an understanding of the institutional voids and market opportunities that exist,
even at the “bottom of the pyramid.” 
A  related  advantage  will  be  the  development  of  integrated  frameworks  that  will
allow  the  development  of  pedagogy  that  more  clearly  communicates  the  complexity  of
existing international strategies and organizations. Instead of providing specific answers, the
value of the new framework might be in helping us organize the questions that we should ask
in assessing the performance of firms, industries, clusters, and economies. 
5. The Base of the Pyramid as a New Frontier in International Strategy (S. Hart)
There can be no doubt that what distinguishes the field of international strategy from
its domestic counterpart is that different places have distinctly different characteristics, with
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suggests, however, the conceptualization underpinning most of the work on global strategy to
date has been relatively simple: To find the proper balance between global integration and
local responsiveness (e.g. Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989).
Over  the  past  two  decades  we  have  learned  that  industries  vary  significantly
regarding  this  balance:  global  consumer  products  companies,  for  example,  cannot  be
managed in the same way as global automobile companies. We have also learned that within
global  businesses,  it  is  important  to  organize  key  functions  –R&D,  operations,  and
marketing– in different ways to take advantage of the optimal mix of global scale and local
differences in each. Furthermore, we have seen that certain industries and businesses may
well  be  evolving  toward  a  “transnational”  model  that  combines  aspects  of  both  global
efficiency and local responsiveness, and takes advantage of the ability of MNCs to leverage
learning across country markets (e.g. Hedlund, 1986). 
Important as this work has been, it leaves many stones unturned in our quest for
understanding the dynamics of globalization and its implications for international strategy. As
the  foregoing  essays  suggest,  semi-globalization,  institutional  voids,  and  the  existence  of
multiple levels of analysis offer important new lenses for framing research in international
business. Each offers the potential for a more nuanced understanding of the “ecology of
places and firms” that is so important to the international business research agenda of the
future.
However, this work, as important as it is, still suffers from the proverbial “iceberg”
problem: It examines only what is readily visible above the surface –the 1 billion or so people
at the top of the economic pyramid– while virtually ignoring the majority of the phenomenon
which lurks below –the 4-5 billion people around the world living in poverty who have been
largely bypassed by globalization. In this essay, I will therefore attempt to articulate the
strategic  logic  for  focusing  on  the  “base  of  the  pyramid”  as  an  important  new  research
frontier in international strategy.
Why the Base of the Pyramid?
With the fall of communism in the late 1980s, academic work on emerging market
strategy (like its cousin, global strategy) experienced rapid growth, as transition economies
opened their markets to foreign investment (see, for example, Hoskisson, Eden, Lau and
Wright, 2000). By the late 1990’s, however, corporate momentum in emerging markets had
slowed  considerably.  The  prospect  for  millions  of  new  middle  class  consumers  in  the
developing world was vastly oversold. The Asian and Latin American financial crises put a
damper on the rate of foreign direct investment. The events of September 11, 2002 then
served  to  further  hasten  the  retreat.  Established  markets  became  increasingly  saturated,
leaving MNCs wondering where future growth would come from (Prahalad and Hart, 2002).
In addition, there has been a rising tide of anti-globalization sentiment around the
world.  Demonstrations  from  Seattle  to  Cancun  have  made  it  apparent  that  if  corporate
expansion is seen to come at the expense of the poor and the environment, it will encounter
vigorous resistance. Indeed, as MNCs sought to satisfy shareholders by entering emerging
markets,  they  increasingly  heard  concerns  from  many  quarters  about  environmental
degradation, labor exploitation, cultural hegemony, and loss of local autonomy (Hart and
Christensen, 2002). The recent scandals involving major global corporations such as Enron
and WorldCom have served only to fan the flames of anti-corporate sentiment.
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and emerging market strategies from the 1990s have been failures: The truth is they were
neither very global nor particularly emerging market-oriented. Indeed, the vast majority of
FDI over the past decade has been directed at the established markets in the US, Europe and
Japan, not the emerging markets of the developing world (Sachs, 1998). Developed countries
have also been the context for most international business research over the past decade (e.g.
Tallman, 2001). In the developing world, most FDI has targeted only the few “large market”
countries such as China, India, and Brazil. And even there, most MNC emerging market
strategies have focused exclusively on the elite and emerging middle class markets, ignoring
the vast majority of people considered too poor to be viable customers (de Soto, 2000).
Many reasons have been offered to justify and explain MNC preoccupation with the
top of the economic pyramid in emerging economies: Hitt et al (2000), for example, suggests
that such customers are more similar to American, European, and Japanese consumers, which
MNCs  are  accustomed  to  serving,  and  thus  present  less  “psychic  distance”  than  do  the
impoverished inhabitants of shantytowns and rural villages. Khanna and Palepu (1997) point
to the lack of important institutions in the developing world, which makes conventional MNC
operations all but impossible. Indeed, there is a healthy literature focusing on how MNCs can
address  gaps  in  the  business  environment  in  emerging  economies  through  the  use  of
alliances, networks, and interpersonal ties with local players (e.g. Beamish, 1987; Khanna
and Rivkin, 2001; Peng and Luo, 2000).
Unfortunately, MNC strategies aimed at tailoring existing products to better fit the
needs  of  the  elites  and  rising  middle  classes  in  the  developing  world  have  inadvertently
resulted  in  a  form  of  “corporate  imperialism”  (Prahalad  and  Lieberthal,  1998).  The
incremental  design  changes  and  cost  reductions  associated  with  this  strategy  have  not
succeeded in making products and services available to the mass markets in the developing
world (Arnold and Quelch, 1998). The net result is that four billion poor at the bottom of the
economic pyramid –fully two-thirds of humanity– have been largely ignored both by MNCs
and IB researchers. They have been bypassed by globalization, their needs are being poorly
met  by  local  vendors,  and  they  are  increasingly  the  victims  of  corruption  and  active
exploitation (Chambers, 1997).
With stagnation in the established markets and rising antiglobalization sentiments,
however, the opportunities for entering the base of the pyramid are becoming increasingly
apparent to both managers and scholars. GDP per capita figures fail to capture the dynamism
that  exists  among  the  aspiring  poor.  Indeed,  it  is  estimated  that  well  over  half  of  total
economic activity in the developing world takes place outside of the formal economy in the
so-called “extralegal” sector; this translates into more than $9 trillion in hidden (unregistered)
assets among the world’s poor (deSoto, 2000). 
In  short,  the  emerging  market  opportunity  may  be  much  larger  than  previously
thought. However, the real source of market promise is not the wealthy few in the developing
world, or even the rising middle class consumers –it is the billions of aspiring poor who are
joining the market economy for the first time (Prahalad and Hart, 2002). However, capturing
the opportunity at the base of the economic pyramid will, in all likelihood, require radical
innovations in strategic thinking. Indeed, as Dawar and Chattopadhyay (2002) observe, it
makes little sense for MNCs to develop homogeneous country strategies in emerging markets
(e.g. China strategy). Instead, it would be far more appropriate to craft separate strategies for
the wealthy, rising middle class, and for poor customers, across country markets (Hart and
Milstein, 1999). Thus, the base of the pyramid is virtually uncharted territory and opens up an
entirely new field of inquiry for the JIBS community.
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For the past five years, a group of colleagues9 has begun to pursue this research
trajectory. Early work (e.g. Hart and Milstein, 1999; Christensen, Craig, and Hart, 2001;
Prahalad  and  Hart,  2002;  Hart  and  Christensen,  2002;  Prahalad  and  Hammond,  2002)
focused on articulating the strategic logic for pursing business strategies aimed at the four
billion poor at the base of the pyramid. In 2000, the group of colleagues at the University of
North Carolina’s Kenan-Flagler Business School created the Base of the Pyramid (BOP)
Learning  Laboratory.  The  BOP  Learning  Lab  is  a  consortium  of  companies,  NGOs,  and
academics  interested  in  identifying,  evaluating  and  quantifying  the  critical  parameters
and interdependencies that govern these market segments and that translate into strategies for
value creation10. 
In 2002, the UNC group won a three-year research grant from the National Science
Foundation to conduct a longitudinal study of BOP ventures being pursued by the MNC
members of the Learning Lab (Milstein and Hart, 2002). As part of this effort, over 30 cases
have already been produced detailing the strategies and business models of ventures focused
on the BOP. These include local companies and non-profits as well as MNC initiatives. Some
of the early findings of this work have now been summarized and placed in the context of the
literatures on global and emerging market strategy (e.g. London and Hart, 2003).
Some  of  the  early  learnings,  based  largely  upon  interviews,  case-comparative
analyses, and grounded theory building, include the following:
1. Incremental adaptation of existing technologies and products is not effective in
the BOP. Successful entry into the BOP appears to require a new approach to
product development based upon deep listening and co-development with local
partners.
2. The BOP forces MNCs to fundamentally rethink business models. Companies
apparently need to transform their understanding of scale, from “bigger is better”
to  a  strategy  of  distributed  small-scale  operations  married  to  world-scale
capabilities such R&D and learning transfer.
3. The  BOP  also  appears  to  demand  a  business  model  premised  upon  capital
efficiency and employment intensity rather than the conventional MNC mentality
of capital intensity and labor efficiency. 
4. Given the small-scale and distributed nature of BOP ventures, it appears to be
important to build relationships with local governments, small entrepreneurs and
non-profits  rather  than  depending  upon  familiar  partners  such  as  central
governments and large local companies.
5. Building relationships directly and at the local level contributes to the social
capital necessary to overcome the lack of formal institutions such as intellectual
property rights and the rule of law.
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9 Colleagues include C.K. Prahalad (University of Michigan), Clay Christensen (Harvard Business School),
Miguel Rodríguez (IESE Business School), Sanjay Sharma (Wilfrid Laurier University), Alan Hammond
(World Resources Institute), Irma Gomez and Nicholas Guttierez (Tec Monterrey), and Jim Johnson, Ted
London, Mark Milstein, Erik Simanis, and Lisa Jones (University of North Carolina).
10 The BOP Learning Lab’s contributing members include DuPont, HP, J&J, P&G, S.C. Johnson, Ford, Dow,
Coke, and Tetrapak. Non-profit organizations such as the Grameen Foundation and the World Resources
Institute are also actively involved.6. Since  the  BOP  possesses  neither  the  institutional  inertia  nor  the  incumbent
density that exists at the top of the pyramid, it offers the ideal conditions for
incubating new, leapfrog technologies.
7. The  base  of  the  pyramid  appears  to  be  especially  appropriate  for  disruptive
technologies  which  dramatically  reduce  environmental  footprint  and  increase
social  benefit  (e.g.  renewable  energy,  distributed  generation,  microcredit,
wireless IT, biotechnology) given the large populations involved.
8. Business models forged successfully at the base of the pyramid have the potential
to travel profitably to higher income markets, offering huge growth potential. It
appears to be easier to add cost and features to a low cost business model than to
remove cost and features from a high cost business model.
Our early work in this new domain confirms our hunch that the base of the pyramid
contains fundamentally new challenges for the field of international strategy and that we have
only scratched the surface. Indeed, widening the strategic bandwidth to include the base of
the pyramid appears to have significant implications for global and emerging market strategy,
innovation theory, and theories of economic development and comparative advantage.
Since  the  BOP  carries  with  it  new  and  challenging  constraints  (e.g.  need  for
dramatically  lower  cost  structures,  smaller  environmental  footprint,  difficult  physical
conditions, different cultural traditions) it might help to expand our thinking not only about
emerging market strategy (as we have seen), but also enrich our understanding about the
nature  of  lead  markets  in  the  innovation  process.  Rather  than  focusing  exclusively  on
the most sophisticated customers as the lead markets (e.g. von Hipple, 1988), it might also be
productive  to  focus  on  the  poorest  and  least  sophisticated  customers  as  drivers  of  the
innovation process. Thus, gaining a foothold in BOP markets may turn out to be crucial to
long term competitive survival in the coming decades (Prahalad and Hart, 2002; Hart and
Christensen, 2002).
With regard to economic development theory, the unique and disruptive character of
BOP  markets  could  help  to  move  us  beyond  the  current  thinking  regarding  comparative
advantage,  where  developing  countries  must  follow  a  predictable  course  of  commodity
production, labor cost, and assembly platform strategies before making the leap to technology
and knowledge-based capabilities. Indeed, the BOP could serve as an incubator for entirely
new and globally competitive enterprises and industries, with developing country companies
leading  the  way.  This  could  provide  a  new  lens  for  thinking  about  national  economic
development strategy (Christensen, Craig, and Hart, 2001).
Some specific research questions regarding the implications of the BOP for MNC
strategy include the following:
– Can MNCs realistically serve the bottom of the pyramid? Can they overcome
lack of familiarity with these contexts and their liability of foreignness? Can they
design business models that compensate for the lack of institutions such as IP
protection and the rule of law and avoid the corrosive effects of corruption?
– Can MNCs design profitable strategies and business models to serve the BOP?
What are the implications for structure/governance, alliances and partnerships,
technology  and  product  development,  supply  chain  and  distribution,  and
knowledge transfer?
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development?  Can  corporations  serve  as  agents  of  poverty  alleviation,
environmental restoration and world betterment while simultaneously developing
entirely new and profitable markets?
Looking Forward
As we enter the 21st century, the institutions of global capitalism find themselves
increasingly under siege. Following the fall of communism in the late 1980s, a decade of
economic globalization, privatization, and free trade has produced mixed results at best. While
developed countries have grown richer, the vast majority of nations and people in the world
have  not  benefited  from  the  apparent  triumph  of  global  capitalism.  Furthermore,  the
underlying natural systems supporting human economies –forests, fisheries, soils, ecosystems,
and climate– have all experienced continuing decline. A rising tide of “antiglobalization” has
emerged which combines concerns about environmental degradation, inequity, human rights,
and loss of local autonomy. And, terrorism –the ultimate form of antiglobalization– is on the
rise, driven by poverty, hopelessness, and desperation.
In short, global capitalism –and IB research– finds itself at a crossroads. Will MNCs
and academics continue to focus primarily on the needs of the wealthy at the top of the
pyramid  to  the  exclusion  of  the  vast  majority  of  humanity?  Will  we  continue  to  exploit
the developing world primarily for its abundant natural resources and cheap labor? Will we
move  increasingly  toward  islands  of  prosperity  and  abundance  in  a  sea  of  poverty  and
despair?  Or,  will  global  capitalism  seek  instead  to  reach  out,  bringing  the  benefits  of
capitalism  to  the  entire  human  community  of  6.2  billion  in  a  way  that  respects  cultural
diversity and the environment?
I believe that the former path is no longer an option –it leads only to oblivion. A
more  inclusive  form  of  international  commerce  is  the  only  socially  and  environmentally
viable path to the future. It may also be the ultimate growth engine for the world economy in
the coming decades. From an academic perspective, the base of the pyramid offers a host of
new and important research questions and contexts that have the potential to add greatly to
our understanding of the ecology of firms and places so important to the field of international
strategy. It is time that we, as a community of scholars, get on with the research needed to
move this great transformation forward. 
6. Conclusions
This  paper  has  presented  several  perspectives  to  open  a  new  frontier  in  the
understanding  of  International  Strategy.  To  explore  it,  we  have  proposed  the  analogy  of
the ecology of firms and places as a way to emphasize that the real problem is the co-location
of different places with different types of firms. Locations are in fact the distinctive content of
International  Business  Strategy.  As  such,  the  fundamental  overlay  question  is  “why  do
countries or locations differ?”
Answering this question is fundamental. However, differences across countries must
be addressed with integrative frameworks that go beyond unilateral measures of difference,
pay implicit attention to industry content, and draw out implications for firm strategy, so as to
shed light on this fundamental issue in International Business Strategy. The proposed concept
of “semiglobalization” and the CAGE model are important steps in this direction.
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intermediary markets in a particular place influence firm positioning and industry structure in
that  place.  Furthermore,  the  impact  of  institutional  voids  crosses  different  places  as
alternative firm organizations compete to take advantage of these differences. The evolution
of these intermediary markets is therefore endogenous to the ecology of places and firms in a
systemic,  integrative  way  that  makes  simplifications  extremely  risky  in  the  design  of
competitive  strategy  in  an  international  context.  In  fact,  it  is  impossible  to  discuss
the efficient cross-border movement of talent, people, or ideas without thinking through the
business decisions of these specialized intermediaries.
Places,  firms,  and  strategies  form  a  complex  ecology.  Multilateral  measures  of
difference,  interrelated  with  intermediary  markets,  make  the  “real”  geography  of  places
extremely  difficult  to  understand  and  use  in  competitive  strategy.  The  competitiveness
literature  proves  useful  for  understanding  the  geography-strategy  link.  The  proposed
framework  incorporates  different  levels  of  analysis,  new  economic  actors  and  a  set  of
primitives (activities, resources and knowledge), and focuses on the key drivers of economic
performance at all relevant levels.
Finally, firms around the ecology of places, and we as scholars in IB, face the great
challenge of bringing prosperity everywhere and not just to a small privileged group. It is
the challenge of developing strategies and business models to serve the majority of humanity
today excluded from world trade. It is the challenge of doing so in a profitable way but also
in a way that is socially and environmentally feasible given limited world resources. It is a
fundamentally different way to think about the ecology of places and firms: changing firms to
impact places in a great transformation for the future.
Moving forward in the new frontier it is not easy. Neither is this the only frontier IB
scholars  should  explore.  However,  it  is  an  intriguing  one,  with  capacity  to  impact  both
research and practice in a field with a great future. It is a way to look for the essential
differentiating element in international strategy, the interplay among firms and places: an
ecology to be understood.
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